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The origins of today’s Russian intelligence services suggest that their
transition to real democratic civilian control—which has yet to happen
more than 15 years after communism’s fall and the Soviet Union’s
breakup—is likely to be anything but easy. Russia, like most of the
post-Soviet states, has failed to develop a well-institionalized demo-
cratic political system. Since the year 2000, when President Boris Yeltsin
engineered the election of his chosen successor Vladimir Putin, the
nearly failed Russian state of the 1990s has given way to a polity that
lives under the domination of the executive branch. It is a cliché to
mention the 16 years that President Putin spent working for the Soviet
intelligence and security agency, the KGB, and the preferential treat-
ment that he has accorded to its succesor agencies. What precisely is the
place of these agencies in today’s Russian political system?
The postcommunist Russian state inherited the old cadre of the So-
viet Union’s Committee of State Security (KGB), which was the final
institutional incarnation of the bulk of the Soviet-era intelligence and
security services. While the last months of the Soviet Union’s existence
saw the splitting of the KGB into several agencies, there has been no
basic change in either the personnel of the state-security establishment
or the broad scope of responsibilities with which it deals. In Russia
today, the Federal Security Service (FSB) handles domestic-security
missions, signals intelligence, border protection, and increasingly in-
telligence activities in the former Soviet states, while the bulk of for-
eign intelligence is the domain of the External Intelligence Service
(SVR) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the armed-forces
general staff. The Federal Protective Service (FSO) guards the physical
Mikhail Tsypkin is associate professor in the Department of National
Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,
California. This paper represents the views of the author and not those of
the Department of the Navy or any other agency of the U.S. government.
Journal of Democracy  Volume 17,  Number 3  July 2006




and communications security of top state officials while the Presiden-
tial Department of Special Projects is charged with keeping leaders se-
cure in the event of war, and maintains a number of underground or
otherwise hardened structures for this purpose.
The high degree of continuity between the Soviet-era agencies and
their Russian successors makes the legacy of the Soviet intelligence
and security services—bodies that carried out one of the twentieth
century’s worst campaigns of mass state terror—crucial for this discus-
sion. The Soviet political leadership always exercised civilian control
of a very narrow kind over the intelligence and security apparatus: Jo-
seph Stalin controlled it singlehandedly, while his successors did the
same in a more collegial fashion, but throughout their history these
agencies operated in complete secrecy and, unconstrained by legality
or publicity, answered to no one save top political leaders. The respon-
sibilities of these agencies were extremely broad: from the traditional
missions of intelligence and counterintelligence, to the regime’s politi-
cal security, to control of all forms of self-expression, and, under Stalin,
even to the design and development of weapons.
The personnel of the security and intelligence services, thought to
number about half a million during the Soviet Union’s heyday, devel-
oped into a closed, privileged—and feared—group of regime enforcers.
During the last two decades of the Soviet period, the KGB appears to
have taken advantage of the general weakness of the USSR’s chief politi-
cal leaders in order to pursue its own bureaucratic self-interest to a greater
degree than it had either under Stalin (d. 1953) or his successor Nikita
Khrushchev (deposed 1964). In the August 1991 attempted hardliners’
coup against Mikhail Gorbachev, the KGB exchanged its important but
subordinate role for that of a leader of a plot to save the Soviet-commu-
nist system. The coup crumbled, apparently after KGB commandos re-
fused to storm the center of resistance near the Russian federal parliament
building (or “White House”) in Moscow, and arrest or kill Boris Yeltsin
and the prodemocratic supporters who were rallying with him. Shortly
after the putsch was foiled, a large crowd of Muscovites cheered as a
crane removed the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinsky (1877–1926), the founder
of the Soviet secret police, from its plinth before the KGB headquarters
building on Lubyanka Square. This symbolic illustration of communism’s
end was at the same time a backhanded compliment of sorts to the KGB,
for implicit in the joy over the statue’s toppling was the public’s recogni-
tion of how critical that agency been to communism’s survival—no monu-
ment to Lenin was removed or destroyed in Moscow at the time.
Civilians in Control?
Four Russian agencies clearly engage in one or more of the four
primary functions of intelligence: collection, analysis, counterintelli-
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gence, and covert action. The FSB carries out a broad range of counter-
intelligence activities. The FSO may engage in some counterintelligence
activities as well, though little is known about what this agency actu-
ally does beyond protecting the physical security of top political
leaders. The SVR gathers and analyzes political and economic intelli-
gence concerning foreign countries, and the GRU collects information
about the military capabilities of other nations. The greatest amount
(and it is not very great) of current reliable information is available
about the FSB. Much less is known about the SVR, and less still about
the GRU and FSO. All these agencies are militarized: Their personnel
hold military ranks and are considered to be the equivalent of armed-
services personnel, not civil servants.
In order to evaluate the state of civilian democratic control over
these agencies, it will be helpful to examine the degree to which the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Russian govern-
ment exert—or fail to exert—oversight powers regarding intelligence
matters. It will also prove useful to consider the relationship of Russian
intelligence agencies with the mass media, since free public discussion
and transparency (even within the limits of secrecy that intelligence
operations normally impose) are important means by which civilian
democratic control can be exercised.
What is the situation regarding oversight by the executive? While
Russia plainly has a strong executive—especially since President Yeltsin
crushed his parliamentary opponents through the use of armed force in
October 1993—the executive branch of the Russian government is pe-
culiarly bifurcated. The president is its top official, while at the same
time he is above it. Article II of the Russian Federation’s constitution
makes the president the “guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian
Federation, of the human and civil rights and freedoms.” The president
provides for the coordinated functioning and cooperation of the bodies
of state power. Under Vladimir Putin, this interpretation of the unique
presidential role has been taken to new and extraordinary lengths. As
the presidential Web site puts it:
Each of the bodies [institutions] of state power only partially provides for
the functioning of the constitution. Only the president has the mission to
protect the foundations of the state as a whole, the sovereignty and integ-
rity of the state. . . . While being legally distant from all branches of
government, the president at the same time is closer to the executive than to
any other branches of government.1
This extraordinary president leaves day-to-day operational control
of the ministries concerned with the economy, education, health care,
and social welfare to the government of the Russian Federation, whose
prime minister the president names subject to confirmation by the State
Duma, the lower house of Russia’s bicameral parliament. Within the
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president’s direct control, however, remains the “presidential bloc” of
21 ministries and other agencies that deals with matters of foreign and
domestic security. The agencies within the bloc include the FSB, SVR,
FSO, and the Defense Ministry (home of the GRU).
While hard information, again, is scarce, it appears that with the
partial exception of the GRU,2 each of the intelligence agencies reports
separately and directly to the president. In other words, Russia seem-
ingly has nothing resembling the U.S. system of “national intelligence
estimates” that formally draw together the collective judgment of all
the national-level agencies charged with intelligence functions. Russia’s
president himself “coordinates” the work of different agencies, which
are not organized horizontally into anything like an intelligence com-
munity of the sort that is found in the United States. In Russia, there are
no formal links between these agencies. While the Security Council,
which acts as the president’s chancellery, may do some coordinating,
there is no official like the U.S. director of central intelligence (head of
the CIA), let alone a post similar to that of the recently created director
of national intelligence in the United States.
A number of published laws and presidential directives lay out the
missions of each agency. As we have seen, the SVR, the GRU, and, to a
degree, the FSB collect most of the foreign intelligence. The first fo-
cuses on politics, economics, military strategy, and science and
technology; while the second studies the military forces and defense
industries of foreign nations. The third seems also to engage in some
foreign-intelligence activities of an unspecified nature.3 The Russian
FSB, moreover, conducts counterterrorism operations throughout the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in cooperation with local
state-security services—a role that clearly requires involvement in in-
telligence and counterintelligence operations in these countries. The
FSB’s deputy director is ex officio the director of the CIS Counterterrorism
Center.4 Meanwhile, the head of the SVR insists that Russia follows the
1992 Almaty Agreement under which the CIS governments are to re-
frain from carrying out intelligence operations aimed at one another.
This may be true—at least as far as the SVR is concerned. The FSB, by
contrast, has probably maintained at least part of the vast network of
informers that covered what was once the USSR and is today the CIS,
making FSB intelligence collection in the former Soviet republics a
feasible prospect.
Yet the FSB’s primary function remains counterintelligence. The law
is vague. It gives the FSB authority to conduct counterintelligence not
only against foreign-intelligence services, terrorists, and those attempt-
ing a violent change of the Russian political system, but also against
“other types of activity” detrimental to the security of Russian Federa-
tion. The FSB’s Third Directorate, like the KGB Third Directorate in
Soviet days, is in charge of counterintelligence in the military. Rounding
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out counterintelligence functions are the powers that the SVR and GRU
have to conduct counterintelligence operations within their own ranks.
Most remarkably, the FSB seems also to have received a mission that
must be considered most unusual for a security agency in even a puta-
tively democratic society. According to persistent reports, the FSB is
reponsible for running the computerized system that processes and re-
ports election results. President Yeltsin established the state automated
elections system (known as Vybory) in 1995, preparatory to the Duma
and presidential elections held, respectively, in December of that year
and in June 1996. Although on paper Vybory is under the Central Elec-
tions Commission, it is common knowledge that the system’s first
custodian was the Federal Agency for Government Communications
and Information (FAPSI), a body responsible for signals intelligence
and secure communications. Since FAPSI’s March 2003 disbandment,
its assets have been shared out among the SVR, GRU, FSO, and FSB.
The last of these is generally assumed to operate the vote-counting
system via an information-technology center nominally under the Cen-
tral Electoral Commission.
Legislative Oversight?
The question mark at the end of the subhead above is fitting, for in
Russia today parliamentary oversight of the security services may fairly
be described as nonexistent. The 1993 constitution does not explicitly
grant parliament investigative powers, mentioning as it does only
parliament’s right to conduct hearings. A law providing specifically for
parliamentary investigations was adopted only in December 2005. Un-
der Yeltsin and even more so under Putin, the Federal Assembly has
undergone a steady weakening. The upper chamber, the Federation
Council, consists of representatives of regional bureaucracies that have
become completely dependent on Putin. It has a Committee on Defense
and Security, whose thinly documented activities seem to deal mostly
with salaries and benefits for members of the military, uniformed police
forces, and intelligence and security services. On those rare occasions
when members of the Federation Council address specifics of intelli-
gence operations, they seem to be less than interested in the issues of
democratic civilian control.
The activities of the Duma’s Committee on Security are much better
documented. Interestingly, 21 of the 29 legislators who serve on this
committee have state-security backgrounds: eight are former KGB or
FSB officers, another eight once worked for the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (or MVD, which controls uniformed police and internal-security
troops), four are ex-military officers, and one is a Soviet-era prosecutor.
Chairman Vladimir Vasiliyev was until recently the first deputy minis-
ter of internal affairs and an MVD general. The practice of putting
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“experts” such as these on committees whose duties include oversight
of the state-security establishment goes back to the last days of the
USSR and its experiment with parliamentary democracy, that is, the
Supreme Soviet elected in 1989. Some informed observers claim that
most of the laws which the Duma’s Security Committee “drafts” are in
fact ghostwritten by staffers from the Russian Federation Security Coun-
cil, an advisory body that works directly for President Putin.
The Duma’s activities in the area of intelligence have mainly to do
not with oversight, but with new legislation. The Russian Federation
has laws on the FSB, counterterrorism, criminal investigations (the FSB
has significant investigative powers), state secrets, national security,
and foreign intelligence. Both houses of the Federal Assembly must
approve the state-security budget, which is published openly, subdi-
vided into just twelve line items. The Accounting Chamber, a nominally
quasi-independent body that the Assembly created along lines mod-
eled after the U.S. Congress’s General Accounting Office, can audit
spending in any program, including those of the security and intelli-
gence agencies. But the Chamber cannot audit, monitor, or oversee
operations, and is appointed by a parliament that is now completely
subservient to the president, so in practice this means little.
Article 23 of the law on the FSB speaks in very general terms about
the right of legislators to obtain information about the FSB and SVR “in
accord with law.” Yet the law is highly restrictive in this regard: The
External Intelligence Law, for instance, forbids MPs from receiving in-
formation about Russia’s foreign-intelligence activities and programs
from any sources other than the appropriate parliamentary committees,
whose members and staffers must in turn all receive security clearances
through a process in which the FSB plays the decisive role. A special
group of Accounting Chamber employees are allowed to request infor-
mation from the SVR about how it puts its budget into execution, but
apparently may ask about nothing else. As constrained as MPs are, how-
ever, perhaps they take some comfort from Article 19 of the FSB law,
which bans that agency from recruiting MPs as secret informers.5
Judging from its published meeting agendas, between January and
July 2004 the Security Committee of the State Duma heard not a single
report on the operations of any state-security or intelligence agency.
Despite its lack of involvement in oversight, however, the Security Com-
mittee still must cope with responsibilities that appear broad and even
overwhelming. Its brief includes legislative issues related to 14 agen-
cies, and lists 39 functional areas as subject to its jurisdiction, includ-
ing traffic safety and firefighting. Despite this apparently sweeping level
of involvement, the committee’s members, like all MPs, first learned of
Putin’s 11 July 2004 FSB-reorganization decree from the news media.
The president had simply not bothered to inform even those legislators
most closely concerned with this agency of his plans for it.
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On 23 October 2002, Chechen terrorists seized more than eight hun-
dred people in a Moscow theater. Early on October 26, the FSB pumped
in an unknown gas and then stormed the building, killing all 42 terror-
ists. The gas also affected the hostages, 129 of whom died. Parliament’s
response to the assault’s costly outcome was a bill, strongly backed by
Duma Security Committee chairman Vasiliyev, that would have muzzled
media reporting of terrorist attacks. The bill was too sweeping for Putin,
who vetoed it. The liberal opposition Union of Right Forces (SPS) party
called for hearings on the theater siege and the government’s handling of
it, but the Duma rejected this move. The SPS then launched its own
investigative commission. Over three days it interviewed eleven wit-
nesses, mostly physicians, only four of whom would allow their names to
be published. The SPS commission’s conclusion was that poor coordina-
tion between the FSB commandos and medical or other rescue personnel
at the scene was responsible for the high death rate among the hostages.
While Putin eventually briefly met with commission chairman Boris
Nemtsov, the president reportedly dismissed its findings as old news.
While the government may have gotten away with presenting the
theater siege as an FSB success, terrorist acts since then have not re-
sulted in decreased pressure for civilian control over intelligence
agencies. In the spring and summer of 2004, Russia experienced an
escalation of terrorist attacks, culminating in the destruction of two
passenger aircraft by suicide bombers and the terrorist seizure on 1
September 2004 of a school and more than a thousand hostages (most of
whom were children) in Beslan, North Ossetia. Russian officials insist
that the chaotic storming of the school, which left at least 330 children
and other civilians dead, was triggered by the explosion of one of the
terrorists’ bombs. Both the public and Russia’s political elite were fright-
ened. Ignoring the lack of a law on parliamentary inquiries, the Federal
Assembly’s two houses formed a joint commission to investigate what
happened at Beslan. It appears that the Putin administration authorized
(or even suggested) this step in the face of public outrage over the
government’s failures first to prevent the terror attack and then to end it
without massive loss of innocent life.
As of this writing in June 2006, the parliamentary commission has
yet to release its final report, though its chairman did deliver a brief
interim report orally in December 2005. According to his remarks, the
commission interviewed many officials, including the head of FSB, but
did not interview President Putin. Its preliminary conclusions aim most
criticism at local government and police officials, not at the FSB.
In December 2005, as we have seen, the Duma adopted a law on parlia-
mentary inquiries. The law’s language—drafted by Putin’s staff—is both
vague and restrictive. Parliamentary inquiries are to be limited to cases of
“especially flagrant or mass violations of human rights” and of natural or
technological disasters, wording that could be construed to bar nearly
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any inquiry. The bill also bans parliament from inquiring about the ac-
tivities of the federal president or about actions that are already subject
to criminal investigation. The first restriction could shield the entire
executive branch from investigation, while the second could allow the
judiciary (which responds readily to executive-branch pressure) to stop a
parliamentary investigation simply by going through the motions of open-
ing a criminal probe. Moreover, the law requires a majority vote of both
houses to set up a commission of inquiry and to accept its report as an
official document. Given the degree to which the executive branch domi-
nates the upper house through presidential appointments, these provi-
sions give the president an effective veto over the entire inquiry process.
The Judicial System and Democratic Control
Current Russian law gives the job of overseeing the FSB and the
foreign-intelligence agencies to the office of the state prosecutor, which
is an arm of the executive branch. The prosecutor-general is appointed
by the president subject to upper-house approval, and has the power to
name all lower-ranking prosecutors. The duty of the prosecutor’s office
is to monitor government agencies’ compliance with the law, including
laws safeguarding the rights of individuals against official abuse. Vio-
lations are supposed to result in referrals to a court or appropriate gov-
ernment body. The prosecutor’s office contains a department charged
specifically with monitoring the operations of security agencies. (It is
unclear from the title of this department if it is involved in overseeing
foreign-intelligence activities.) There is also a special department in the
troubled North Caucasus region, with a mission described as “investiga-
tion of crimes in the field of federal security and interethnic relations.”6
So much for the letter of the law and formal tables of organization:
rights are to be protected, the spies watchdogged by public servants,
and special departments exist to meet the challenge. Russia today, how-
ever, is troubled by a growing gulf between what the law says and the
way things are actually done within the legal system. Yury Schmidt,
one of Russia’s most prominent defense attorneys and a veteran of sev-
eral cases involving the FSB, describes the situation as follows:
Paradoxically, laws are becoming more liberal. . . . But the more liberal the
laws, the more often they are violated, and the court actions become in-
creasingly hard-line compared to the law. . . . The more liberal the law, the
more frequently it is violated, because the mentality of the judges has failed
to adapt to the new conditions.7
Prosecutorial oversight is another institutional legacy from Soviet
times, when it was widely regarded as a joke. The task of Soviet pros-
ecutors was to do the will of the party-state, legality be damned. Their
complicity in illegal KGB actions against dissidents from the 1960s to
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the 1980s has been abundantly documented. Unfortunately, Russia’s
post-1991 prosecutors (most of whom are Soviet-era products) carry on
the traditions and attitudes of the USSR’s hyperpoliticized state pros-
ecutors: Putin has used these government lawyers as a tool for intimi-
dating Russian tycoons (whose wealth he evidently sees as a threat to
his power) through selective applications of the law.
The FSB has played an important role in the war in Chechnya, where
massive human rights violations by Russian forces and Chechen insur-
gents alike have been well documented. The law on the FSB limits
prosecutors’ powers by forbidding them from doing anything that might
compromise the identity of FSB informers and by making it clear that
their oversight powers do not extend to the “organization, tactics, meth-
ods, and means of work of the FSB.” The Law on External Intelligence
contains similar language. Not surprisingly, no federal prosecutor has
taken any action regarding allegations of human rights violations in-
volving the FSB. Moreover, a local prosecutor who had been investi-
gating disappearances in the Republic of Ingushetia (Chechnya’s neigh-
bor) recently disappeared himself just after returning from a trip that he
had taken to Moscow in order to complain about the complicity of local
FSB operatives in the Ingushetian incidents.
In a liberal democracy, media reports on intelligence-related matters
play an important role in fueling public discussion and helping to main-
tain democratic control. While Russia no longer has limits on speech
and publication anywhere near as pervasive and intense as those that it
had in Soviet days, the masters of the secret world have become skilled
at neutralizing and exploiting the mass media under the new system.
The FSB has the most intense relationship with the media. Even during
the era of Yeltsin, who was genuinely committed to the freedom of the
press, the FSB sought influence by planting news stories and doing
favors for journalists. Direct contacts between the SVR and GRU on the
one hand and the press on the other are rare, and usually deal with the
release of historical information.
The Law on State Secrets, passed in 1993 and amended in 1997, has
become an effective instrument for cutting off investigative reporting
on national-security matters. While only one journalist has actually been
jailed under this legislation, many others have reported ominous invita-
tions to “chat” with FSB officials in Lefortovo Prison, where they point-
edly keep their offices. (Currently this infamous jail is being transferred
from the FSB’s jurisdiction to that of the Justice Ministry.) Invariably,
the subject of the talk is an alleged violation of the state-secrets law.
As the Russian Index on Censorship has documented, the FSB has
successfully planted a stream of stories in the media.8 These “active mea-
sures” have several goals. One is to improve the reputation of the FSB by
whitewashing the past of its KGB predecessor. This can involve securing
the publication of laudatory articles, replete with quotes from retired
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KGB officers, on figures such as Yuri Andropov, the longtime KGB chair-
man who ran the Soviet Union from 1982 until his death in 1984.
Another goal of the FSB’s media manipulations is to present an un-
critical view of its current operations. A good example of this was the
avalanche of “exclusive” interviews given by FSB veterans and active-
duty officers alike in the wake of the Moscow theater debacle. They formed
a chorus of expert voices seeking to convince the public that while 129
innocent people may have died, the FSB was absolutely above reproach.
Most Russians get their news from television; since the government
tightly controls all major channels, critical information about the secu-
rity apparatus never reaches the screen. The print and Internet media
operate relatively freely, but their reach is limited; newspapers cost too
much for many Russians, and only about 15 million citizens (out of a
population of about 143 million) use the Internet at least once a week.9
Still, many newspapers are available online now, together with other
sources of information. While newspapers and the Internet can raise
criticisms of the intelligence agencies, they can rarely do investigative
journalism on this subject because of lack of access to relevant docu-
ments and the severe punishments that would be meted out to officers
who gave information to reporters.
Even cases of great significance have received little objective press
coverage. In September 1999, two apartment buildings in Moscow and
one in Volgodonsk exploded, killing hundreds. The Russian govern-
ment immediately blamed Chechen terrorists, thereby boosting support
for a renewal of the war to bar Chechnya’s secession from the Russian
Federation. Only two people—neither of whom appeared to be a master-
mind of the bombings—have been convicted, and both were tried in
secret. The press has received scant information about the attacks, and
has failed to ask questions, as it plainly should have: Neither defendant
was a Chechen or from Chechnya (both were from the Karachai-
Cherkessian Republic within Russia), and the bombings were allegedly
ordered and paid for by a shadowy, Chechnya-based Islamic extremist
from the Arab world known as Khattab. Khattab, who was later killed
fighting in Chechnya, had connections and interests that might have
led investigators far away from Chechnya. One may speculate that given
the Russian government’s interest in equating terrorism with the Chechen
insurgency, Khattab’s foreign links were a subject that authorities did
not wish to see pursued.
An Overdetermined Weakness
While democratic civilian control over intelligence is plainly miss-
ing in Russia, no single cause fully explains this state of affairs. The
main factor is Russia’s postcommunist political system, in which the
executive branch dominates the legislative and judicial ones, and the
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hypertrophied institution of the presidency dominates all three branches
of government. Under such an arrangement, the intelligence agencies
are likely to be an instrument of the president’s personal power—espe-
cially when that president is himself a proud KGB veteran. This
hypertrophy of presidential powers and the executive branch is due to
the early failure to establish a system of checks and balances. While
some argue that the feebleness of checks and balances in Russia has
come about under pressure of the threat from terrorism, the subjugation
of Russia’s parliament began in 1993, two years before the country
suffered its first serious terror attack when Chechen terrorists struck the
town of Budennovsk on 14 June 1995.
Moreover, the severely transparency-restricting Law on State Secrets
was adopted in 1993, and amended in 1997. The Law on the FSB was
adopted in mid-1995, and therefore must have been in preparation long
before the Budennovsk attack. The Law on External Intelligence was
adopted in December 1995. Even as late as 1997, terrorism was not a
source of great concern to Russian leaders: The National Security Con-
cept of the Russian Federation, adopted in December 1997, mentions
“international terrorism” only briefly.
While fear of terrorism is not the original reason for weak democratic
control, heightened worries about security have certainly not made it
easier to bring the intelligence agencies within the bounds of demo-
cratic accountability. The same 1997 National Security Concept that
dealt with terrorism only in passing also dwelt on the threat of ethnic
separatism. For Russia, the two are closely related since the war against
terror is largely a war against Chechen separatists who use terrorist tac-
tics asymmetrically against the vastly more powerful Russian state. In
societies at war, the executive often becomes stronger than the legisla-
tive and judicial branches, while democratic civilian control over security
and intelligence agencies is often weakened. Recently stepped-up ef-
forts to control more tightly what the mass media reports regarding
security matters may be explained by the Kremlin’s view that the first
war in Chechnya (1994–96) was lost in the Russian media.
There is also a cultural factor at work. The Russian public tends to
take a favorable view of intelligence and security agencies and those
who work for them. Even in the early 1990s, after years of media attacks
against the KGB and revelations of horrible crimes which that agency
had committed in the none-too-distant past, many Russians still viewed
KGB officers as highly intelligent and professional. In March 2002,
only 33.7 percent of Russians polled said that they trusted the Federa-
tion Council, while 52.5 percent trusted the FSB.10 In October 2002, the
State Duma enjoyed the trust of only 25.2 percent of the public while
the FSB, according to the same survey, was trusted by 40.9 percent.11
There has never been much public support for lustration of the offic-
ers of the former KGB, or even for milder measures such as something
Mikhail Tsypkin 83
like South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. There is no
better demonstration of this public attitude than the popularity and
overwhelming political success of Vladimir Putin, a proud former KGB
officer and FSB chief. When Yeltsin
named Putin as his prime minister in Au-
gust 1999, one of the younger man’s first
official acts was to restore the memorial
plaque honoring Yuri Andropov to the
spot on the wall of the FSB headquarters
building from which it had been removed
in 1991. This was not only a friendly ges-
ture toward Putin’s and Andropov’s fel-
low siloviki (that is, those affiliated with
government agencies that are authorized
to use force), but also a recognition of
Andropov’s popularity with a large part
of the public. Nevertheless, recent opinion surveys suggest that Rus-
sians are unwilling to sacrifice basic liberties and democratic institu-
tions for the sake of fighting terrorism.
The extreme weakness of civilian democratic control also owes some-
thing to the changing composition of Russia’s leadership. One of the
most important political phenomena of the last several years has been
the influx of intelligence and military officers into other areas of the
executive branch. The process began while Yeltin was still in control.
In late 1998 and early 1999, former SVR director Yevgeny Primakov
was prime minister. At the same time, former KGB officer Nikolai
Bordyuzha was head of the Presidential Administration, while other ex-
KGB men filled such posts as chief of staff of the ministerial cabinet,
deputy secretary of the Security Council, chief executive of the state-
owned arms-export company, chief military prosecutor, chief of
personnel for the Presidential Administration, first deputy chief of the
presidential press service, and deputy director of the official ITAR-
TASS news agency.12
Since Putin won his first presidential election in 2000, the migration
of siloviki into the senior ranks of the civilian bureaucracy has gained
speed. According to one recent study, more than a third—34.9 per-
cent—of newly appointed deputy ministers are from the state-security
establishment. Almost half of these, in turn, come from just two agen-
cies: the FSB and the SVR. In most cases, these officers have not been
recruited by the ministries, but instead are Putin’s appointees. Such
officers stay in “active reserve,” keeping their rank and pay grade in
their intelligence or military agency. They collect two salaries and con-
tinue to report to their “alma mater.”13 Russia’s defense minister (who is
also deputy prime minister) and armed-forces personnel chief are both
from the KGB, the former by way of the SVR and the latter by way of the
One of the most impor-
tant political phenom-
ena of the last several
years has been the
influx of intelligence
and military officers
into other areas of the
executive branch.
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FSB. The SVR’s former director, a professional intelligence officer and
SVR general, is now the first deputy minister of foreign affairs. Two of
the Security Council’s three deputy secretaries are KGB veterans.
This massive infusion of officials from the security apparat has re-
sulted in increased hostility in the high echelons of power to the ideas
of checks and balances and of transparency in government operations.
The intelligence-agency officers and veterans are motivated both by
their institutional culture as well as by self-interest.  Olga
Kryshtanovskaya, a student of Russian elites, suggests that the siloviki
are driven by their conviction that Russia needs a strong state and by
their impression that accepting checks and balances would make the
maintenance of such a state impossible.14
The ingrained disposition of the siloviki is thus to weaken or elimi-
nate altogether the system of checks and balances, thereby making demo-
cratic civilian oversight of the agencies impossible. This ambition fits
well with their desire to serve their interests as a group. During the 1990s,
various close-knit groups (mafias) that worked in secret and bypassed the
weakened state made enormous economic gains. Sidelined, the men who
had run the old security state stood by and watched. Under Putin, these
people have been given a chance to catch up. They are tight-knit too, and
they know how to operate in secret—both qualities that bode well for
success in the Russian government and economy of the early twenty-first
century. With parliament, the judicial system, and the media exerting no
real oversight powers, the intelligence and security elites can redistribute
wealth to themselves and their ilk without much to stop them.
It would be wrong to consider Russia’s situation in isolation from its
international context. Just as Western ways arguably had some influ-
ence on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates, so in
somewhat parallel fashion may it be asserted that Vladimir Putin has
drawn encouragement from the post-9/11 trend in the West (and espe-
cially the United States) toward strengthening the executive at the
expense of the two other branches, weakening legislative oversight of
intelligence and security agencies, and ignoring legal limitations on
their actions. As Aleksandr Golts, one of the most perceptive and persis-
tent liberal critics of Putin’s policies, puts it, U.S. policies ranging from
the Iraq war to extraordinary renditions have helped to make Russia’s
leaders feel less inhibited about unleashing their own security services
and thus have done “a lot of damage to Russian democracy.”15
Nothing about the underlying situation that has allowed the siloviki
to become so overbearingly strong will change unless and until the
Russian people face squarely the malign role that spies and secret po-
licemen responsibile only to some supreme leader have played in their
country’s history. The public’s ambivalent attitude toward the past and
present of the intelligence and security agencies may be gleaned by
glancing at a Moscow street map: Russia’s capital has one thoroughfare
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named for the great human rights activist Andrei Sakharov, and another
named in honor of his chief tormentor, Yuri Andropov. The balance
between state power and society’s right to demand accountability from
its rulers remains to be redressed in postcommunist Russia.
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